Built to say no by default.
A vault is only as good as how it behaves on a bad day. Here's how Onshore protects values and keys, how it fails, and what's still on our list.
Envelope encryption
Each value is encrypted on its own. Data keys are stored only in wrapped form.
Split key custody
The bundled key service needs three of five key holders to unseal. Banks can use their own HSM over PKCS#11.
Default deny
Without a policy allowing it, the answer is no.
Tenant boundaries
Tenants are kept apart, and internal endpoints can't be reached from outside. Internal traffic uses mutual TLS.
Separated planes
The control API's database role can't read vault data.
Two-person rule
Sensitive changes can require a second approver, and an author can't approve their own rule.
Tamper-evident audit
Entries are hash-chained with signed daily checkpoints. A SIEM copy covers the time between them.
Getting back in safely
Password resets and invitations by your own mail server, single-use recovery codes, and admin resets that need another admin. Links work once and are stored only as hashes.
Fails closed
If the key service is sealed or the vault can't be reached, values stay hidden.
Early access, and straight about it.
If you’re assessing a data vault, you need to know what hasn’t happened yet as well as what has.
Not done yet. We've run our own attack suite, and that doesn't replace an outside test.
Not accepted yet. It stays this way until that test and the items below are closed.
We hold no ISO 27001 or other certification today.
Support adapters and single sign-on have been tested against stand-ins. Live trials come with early customers.
Performance needs measuring on production servers in Nigeria.
Found a security issue? Email [email protected] and we’ll get back to you.
Bring your hardest questions.
We'd rather go through your security questionnaire now than surprise you later.